7011e78ece
Three arrangements, with key material generated for the run rather than kept in the tree: a proxy wrapped in TLS, a proxy that reaches a TLS parent and verifies it against the CA, and MITM. The MITM case checks what interception is for: the decrypted request line, URI and all, reaches the log, where the same request through a plain CONNECT tunnel leaves only the host and port. The origin runs in its own process there so the proxy log holds only what the proxy saw, and log assertions wait, since a record is written when the connection finishes rather than when the reply arrives. Verification of the spoofed certificate is deliberately not strict: 3proxy issues those without an Authority Key Identifier, which Python rejects under its 3.13 defaults.
2.8 KiB
Regression tests
python3 tests/run.py # every case
python3 tests/run.py httpsrv # cases whose name matches
python3 tests/run.py --bin build/bin/3proxy
python3 tests/run.py -v # print every check
python3 tests/run.py --keep # keep the configurations and logs
Python 3.6 or later and a built 3proxy are the only requirements: the suite
is standard library throughout, so it runs wherever 3proxy builds. The TLS
case additionally wants openssl on PATH to generate its key material, and
skips itself when that is missing or the build has no TLS support. With no
--bin it looks in bin/, then build/bin/, then the per-configuration
directories a multi-configuration CMake generator uses.
The proxy under test is also the origin server the tests talk to: the http
command's echo operation reports back how a request arrived - method, path,
query, host, and the source port it came from - and data generates a body
of a requested size, framing, status and pace. So a case can state what a
proxy should do to a request and then read off what actually reached the
other side.
Adding a case
A case is a module under cases/ exporting run(t). It writes the
configurations it needs, starts them, and says what it expects:
def run(t):
srv = t.free_port()
t.start("my_case", f"""
log
auth iponly
allow *
http * /echo echo
httpsrv -p{srv}
""", ports=[srv])
r = t.http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv}/echo")
t.eq(200, r.status, "the server answers")
t.contains(r, "method=GET", "the method is reported")
Servers are stopped for you when the case ends, whether or not it passed.
t offers http() (direct, through an HTTP proxy, or over a CONNECT
tunnel), socks_http() and socks_connect() for SOCKS4 and SOCKS5,
socks_udp_associate(), raw() for bytes a real client would never send,
and run_config() for configurations that are meant to be rejected.
Assertions are eq, ne, contains, not_contains, in_range,
not_in_range, plus ok, fail and skip. harness.field() and
int_field() pull a single line out of an echo reply.
t.certs() generates a CA, a second unrelated CA, and a certificate for
127.0.0.1, once per run and inside the run's temporary directory, so no key
material lives in the tree. t.https(), t.tls_proxy_http() and
t.socks_http() reach a server through TLS, a TLS-wrapped proxy, or SOCKS.
Log records are written when a connection finishes rather than when the
reply arrives, so assert on them through t.wait_output(server, text).
Note that access rules accumulate until flush, so a service section that
means to stand on its own should start with one - otherwise an earlier
allow * matches first and the rule under test is never reached.