3proxy/SECURITY.md
Vladimir Dubrovin 34722c031f Drop the Ed25519 release key
No published release was ever signed with it - signing was introduced after
0.9.9 - so it verifies nothing and only adds a second key for users to reason
about.
2026-08-22 10:39:06 +03:00

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Markdown

# Security Policy
## Supported Versions
| Version | Supported |
| ------- | ------------------ |
| 0.9.8 | :white_check_mark: |
| < 0.9.8 | :x: |
## Reporting a Vulnerability
Report to 3proxy@3proxy.org or via [GitHub security reporting](https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy/security)
For High/Critical patched version is released within 2 weeks
## Verifying downloads
Release binaries are published with SHA256 checksums, an OpenPGP signature and
a GitHub build provenance attestation.
The release signing key is `3proxy-release-key.asc` in the root of this
repository, an RSA-4096 key:
```
pub rsa4096 2026-08-21 [SC]
FC12 2144 99FC C7BA 1CFF 6CDC 0312 384E 3A73 940B
uid 3proxy release signing <3proxy@3proxy.org>
```
Import it once:
```
gpg --import 3proxy-release-key.asc
```
Checksums and the checksum file signature:
```
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-x86_64.asc SHA256SUMS-x86_64
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-x86_64
```
RPM packages are signed, the signature is checked by rpm itself:
```
sudo rpm --import 3proxy-release-key.asc
rpm -K 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.rpm
```
DEB packages are published with a detached signature:
```
gpg --verify 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.deb.asc 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.deb
```
Build provenance (which workflow, commit and runner produced the file) is
verified with the GitHub CLI:
```
gh attestation verify 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.rpm --owner 3proxy
gh attestation verify oci://docker.io/3proxy/3proxy:lts --owner 3proxy
```
Windows binaries are Authenticode signed in addition to the above.