mirror of
https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy.git
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95 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
95 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Supported Versions
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| Version | Supported |
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| ------- | ------------------ |
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| 0.9.9.x (LTS) | :white_check_mark: |
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| 1.0.x (Main) | :white_check_mark: |
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| <= 0.9.8 | :x: |
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## Hardening a deployment
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Configuration is where most of the risk lives. The security recommendations are
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kept in [doc/html/securityen.html](doc/html/securityen.html), published at
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<https://3proxy.org/securityen.html>: how to run the service, what the
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ACLs have to cover, and the settings whose defaults are safe only until
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something else is enabled alongside them.
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Read it before exposing a service. Recurring points from it:
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- Run unprivileged, never suid, and chroot where the platform allows.
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- Name the internal and external interfaces explicitly, and limit sources and
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destinations with ACLs rather than relying on defaults.
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- Enabling IPv6 makes ACLs written in IPv4 incomplete: the same host is
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reachable through an IPv4-mapped address, and the IPv6 loopback is an
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address of its own.
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- Anything that terminates or intercepts TLS holds key material and sees full
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request URLs; both the key and the logs need protecting.
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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Report to 3proxy@3proxy.org or via [GitHub security reporting](https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy/security)
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For High/Critical patched version is released within 2 weeks
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## Verifying downloads
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Release binaries and the source tarball are published with SHA256 checksums, an
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OpenPGP signature and a GitHub build provenance attestation.
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The release signing key is `3proxy-release-key.asc` in the root of this
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repository, an RSA-4096 key:
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```
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pub rsa4096 2026-08-21 [SC]
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FC12 2144 99FC C7BA 1CFF 6CDC 0312 384E 3A73 940B
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uid 3proxy release signing <3proxy@3proxy.org>
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```
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Import it once:
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```
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gpg --import 3proxy-release-key.asc
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```
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Checksums and the checksum file signature:
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```
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gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-x86_64.asc SHA256SUMS-x86_64
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sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-x86_64
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```
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The source tarball published with each release is signed as well:
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```
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gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-src.asc SHA256SUMS-src
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sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-src
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gpg --verify 3proxy-0.9.9.tar.gz.asc 3proxy-0.9.9.tar.gz
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```
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Prefer it over the `Source code (tar.gz)` link GitHub generates automatically:
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only the published tarball is signed. It is produced with `git archive` from
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the release tag, so it can be regenerated and compared byte for byte.
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RPM packages are signed, the signature is checked by rpm itself:
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```
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sudo rpm --import 3proxy-release-key.asc
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rpm -K 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.rpm
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```
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DEB packages are published with a detached signature:
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```
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gpg --verify 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.deb.asc 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.deb
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```
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Build provenance (which workflow, commit and runner produced the file) is
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verified with the GitHub CLI:
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```
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gh attestation verify 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.rpm --owner 3proxy
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gh attestation verify oci://docker.io/3proxy/3proxy:latest --owner 3proxy
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```
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