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Three arrangements, with key material generated for the run rather than kept in the tree: a proxy wrapped in TLS, a proxy that reaches a TLS parent and verifies it against the CA, and MITM. The MITM case checks what interception is for: the decrypted request line, URI and all, reaches the log, where the same request through a plain CONNECT tunnel leaves only the host and port. The origin runs in its own process there so the proxy log holds only what the proxy saw, and log assertions wait, since a record is written when the connection finishes rather than when the reply arrives. Verification of the spoofed certificate is deliberately not strict: 3proxy issues those without an Authority Key Identifier, which Python rejects under its 3.13 defaults.
64 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Regression tests
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python3 tests/run.py # every case
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python3 tests/run.py httpsrv # cases whose name matches
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python3 tests/run.py --bin build/bin/3proxy
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python3 tests/run.py -v # print every check
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python3 tests/run.py --keep # keep the configurations and logs
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Python 3.6 or later and a built 3proxy are the only requirements: the suite
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is standard library throughout, so it runs wherever 3proxy builds. The TLS
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case additionally wants `openssl` on PATH to generate its key material, and
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skips itself when that is missing or the build has no TLS support. With no
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`--bin` it looks in `bin/`, then `build/bin/`, then the per-configuration
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directories a multi-configuration CMake generator uses.
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The proxy under test is also the origin server the tests talk to: the `http`
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command's `echo` operation reports back how a request arrived - method, path,
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query, host, and the source port it came from - and `data` generates a body
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of a requested size, framing, status and pace. So a case can state what a
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proxy should do to a request and then read off what actually reached the
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other side.
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## Adding a case
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A case is a module under `cases/` exporting `run(t)`. It writes the
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configurations it needs, starts them, and says what it expects:
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```python
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def run(t):
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srv = t.free_port()
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t.start("my_case", f"""
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log
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auth iponly
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allow *
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http * /echo echo
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httpsrv -p{srv}
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""", ports=[srv])
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r = t.http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv}/echo")
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t.eq(200, r.status, "the server answers")
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t.contains(r, "method=GET", "the method is reported")
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```
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Servers are stopped for you when the case ends, whether or not it passed.
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`t` offers `http()` (direct, through an HTTP proxy, or over a CONNECT
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tunnel), `socks_http()` and `socks_connect()` for SOCKS4 and SOCKS5,
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`socks_udp_associate()`, `raw()` for bytes a real client would never send,
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and `run_config()` for configurations that are meant to be rejected.
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Assertions are `eq`, `ne`, `contains`, `not_contains`, `in_range`,
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`not_in_range`, plus `ok`, `fail` and `skip`. `harness.field()` and
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`int_field()` pull a single line out of an `echo` reply.
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`t.certs()` generates a CA, a second unrelated CA, and a certificate for
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127.0.0.1, once per run and inside the run's temporary directory, so no key
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material lives in the tree. `t.https()`, `t.tls_proxy_http()` and
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`t.socks_http()` reach a server through TLS, a TLS-wrapped proxy, or SOCKS.
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Log records are written when a connection finishes rather than when the
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reply arrives, so assert on them through `t.wait_output(server, text)`.
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Note that access rules accumulate until `flush`, so a service section that
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means to stand on its own should start with one - otherwise an earlier
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`allow *` matches first and the rule under test is never reached.
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