fdd303ee32
A rewrite only reached the copy of the request kept for logging. On a direct connection the server is sent the request line held in the header buffer, which was parsed and reduced to its path before the filters ran, so the rewrite showed up in the log and nowhere else. Through an HTTP parent the rewritten copy is what goes out, which is why it appeared to work there. Splice the new path back into that buffer. The destination was chosen, and the access rules applied to it, before the rewrite happened, so a rewrite that changes the method or the authority is left alone: acting on it would send the request somewhere the rules never saw. Say so in the manual. The copy needed to notice a rewrite is only taken when a request filter exists, so a proxy without one does no extra work. |
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| .. | ||
| cases | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| harness.py | ||
| README.md | ||
| run.py | ||
Regression tests
python3 tests/run.py # every case
python3 tests/run.py httpsrv # cases whose name matches
python3 tests/run.py --bin build/bin/3proxy
python3 tests/run.py -v # print every check
python3 tests/run.py --keep # keep the configurations and logs
Python 3.6 or later and a built 3proxy are the only requirements: the suite
is standard library throughout, so it runs wherever 3proxy builds. The TLS
case additionally wants openssl on PATH to generate its key material, and
skips itself when that is missing or the build has no TLS support. With no
--bin it looks in bin/, then build/bin/, then the per-configuration
directories a multi-configuration CMake generator uses.
The proxy under test is also the origin server the tests talk to: the http
command's echo operation reports back how a request arrived - method, path,
query, host, and the source port it came from - and data generates a body
of a requested size, framing, status and pace. So a case can state what a
proxy should do to a request and then read off what actually reached the
other side.
Adding a case
A case is a module under cases/ exporting run(t). It writes the
configurations it needs, starts them, and says what it expects:
def run(t):
srv = t.free_port()
t.start("my_case", f"""
log
auth iponly
allow *
http * /echo echo
httpsrv -p{srv}
""", ports=[srv])
r = t.http(f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv}/echo")
t.eq(200, r.status, "the server answers")
t.contains(r, "method=GET", "the method is reported")
Servers are stopped for you when the case ends, whether or not it passed.
t offers http() (direct, through an HTTP proxy, or over a CONNECT
tunnel), socks_http() and socks_connect() for SOCKS4 and SOCKS5,
socks_udp_associate(), raw() for bytes a real client would never send,
and run_config() for configurations that are meant to be rejected.
Assertions are eq, ne, contains, not_contains, in_range,
not_in_range, plus ok, fail and skip. harness.field() and
int_field() pull a single line out of an echo reply.
t.certs() generates a CA, a second unrelated CA, and a certificate for
127.0.0.1, once per run and inside the run's temporary directory, so no key
material lives in the tree. t.https(), t.tls_proxy_http() and
t.socks_http() reach a server through TLS, a TLS-wrapped proxy, or SOCKS.
Log records are written when a connection finishes rather than when the
reply arrives, so assert on them through t.wait_output(server, text).
Note that access rules accumulate until flush, so a service section that
means to stand on its own should start with one - otherwise an earlier
allow * matches first and the rule under test is never reached.