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Three arrangements, with key material generated for the run rather than kept in the tree: a proxy wrapped in TLS, a proxy that reaches a TLS parent and verifies it against the CA, and MITM. The MITM case checks what interception is for: the decrypted request line, URI and all, reaches the log, where the same request through a plain CONNECT tunnel leaves only the host and port. The origin runs in its own process there so the proxy log holds only what the proxy saw, and log assertions wait, since a record is written when the connection finishes rather than when the reply arrives. Verification of the spoofed certificate is deliberately not strict: 3proxy issues those without an Authority Key Identifier, which Python rejects under its 3.13 defaults. |
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| .. | ||
| admin.py | ||
| httpsrv_auth.py | ||
| httpsrv_ops.py | ||
| httpsrv_parsing.py | ||
| httpsrv_rules.py | ||
| parent_ports.py | ||
| proxy_http.py | ||
| socks.py | ||
| ssl.py | ||