mirror of
https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy.git
synced 2026-11-05 01:15:48 +08:00
629a978c00
Some checks failed
C/C++ CI Linux / ${{ matrix.target }} (ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI Linux / ${{ matrix.target }} (ubuntu-latest) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI MacOS / ${{ matrix.target }} (macos-15) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI Windows / ${{ matrix.target }} (windows-2022) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI cmake / ${{ matrix.target }} (macos-15) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI cmake / ${{ matrix.target }} (ubuntu-24.04-arm) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI cmake / ${{ matrix.target }} (ubuntu-latest) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI cmake / ${{ matrix.target }} (windows-2022) (push) Has been cancelled
C/C++ CI cmake / ubuntu-latest (wolfSSL) (push) Has been cancelled
3proxy --help (and the usage message of a bad invocation) now lists what the build was made with: TLS and its backend, RADIUS, PCRE, IPv6, UNIX sockets, the built-in HTTP server, transparency, ODBC and the optional proxy services. The test runner reads the list before the first case and the cases state the features they need with t.skip_unless(), so a build without a feature skips its cases instead of failing them; a binary too old to report anything skips the cases with needs and runs the rest.
92 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
92 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
"""Request parsing: decoding, path safety, malformed and oversized input.
|
|
|
|
These go over a raw socket, because a well-behaved client would normalise
|
|
most of them away before they ever reached the server.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run(t):
|
|
if not t.skip_unless("httpsrv"):
|
|
return
|
|
srv = t.free_port()
|
|
t.start("httpsrv_parsing", f"""
|
|
log
|
|
auth iponly
|
|
allow *
|
|
http echo * /echo**
|
|
http echo * /safe/**
|
|
httpsrv -p{srv}
|
|
""", ports=[srv])
|
|
|
|
def request(path, host="t", extra=""):
|
|
return t.raw(srv, f"GET {path} HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: {host}\r\n{extra}\r\n")
|
|
|
|
# --- percent-decoding ---------------------------------------------
|
|
reply = request("/%65cho")
|
|
t.contains(reply, "200 OK", "a percent-encoded path is decoded before matching")
|
|
t.contains(reply, "path=/echo", "the decoded path is what gets reported")
|
|
t.contains(request("/echo%20space"), "glob= space",
|
|
"an encoded space decodes into the glob")
|
|
|
|
# --- traversal -----------------------------------------------------
|
|
for path in ("/safe/../etc/passwd", "/safe/%2e%2e/etc", "/safe/..%2fetc",
|
|
"/echo/../../x"):
|
|
t.not_contains(request(path), "200 OK", f"traversal is refused: {path}")
|
|
|
|
t.contains(request("/safe/./ok"), "200 OK",
|
|
"a harmless dot segment is still served")
|
|
|
|
# --- injection ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
t.not_contains(request("/echo%0d%0aInjected:%20yes"), "Injected: yes",
|
|
"an encoded CRLF cannot inject a header")
|
|
t.not_contains(request("/echo%00cut"), "200 OK", "an encoded NUL is refused")
|
|
|
|
# a header value cannot smuggle a newline into the echoed output
|
|
reply = request("/echo", host="evil", extra="X-Injected: yes\r\n")
|
|
t.not_contains(reply, "host=evil\nX-Injected",
|
|
"header values stay in their own fields")
|
|
|
|
# --- malformed ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
t.not_contains(t.raw(srv, "GARBAGE\r\n\r\n"), "200 OK",
|
|
"a malformed request line is not served")
|
|
t.not_contains(t.raw(srv, "GET\r\n\r\n"), "200 OK",
|
|
"a request line with no URL is not served")
|
|
|
|
# an over-long path has to be refused rather than quietly truncated to
|
|
# something shorter that might match another rule
|
|
t.not_contains(request("/echo" + "a" * 9000), "200 OK",
|
|
"an over-long path is refused, not truncated")
|
|
|
|
# --- methods --------------------------------------------------------
|
|
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv}"
|
|
t.eq(200, t.http(url + "/echo", method="HEAD").status, "HEAD is accepted")
|
|
r = t.http(url + "/echo", method="POST", body="payload=1",
|
|
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"})
|
|
t.contains(r, "method=POST", "POST reaches the handler")
|
|
t.contains(r, "content.length=9", "the POST content length is parsed")
|
|
|
|
# --- dollars in the configuration ------------------------------------
|
|
# Outside quotes a dollar begins the name of a file to include, so an
|
|
# argument holding one is quoted. Two dollars stand for one, which is how
|
|
# a dollar reaches a rule as text.
|
|
dsrv = t.free_port()
|
|
t.start("httpsrv_dollar", f"""
|
|
log
|
|
auth iponly
|
|
allow *
|
|
http redir * /old** 301 "http://example.org/x$$y/$1"
|
|
http redir * "pcre:^/re/([a-z]+)$" 302 "http://example.org/re/$1"
|
|
http echo * /**
|
|
httpsrv -p{dsrv}
|
|
""", ports=[dsrv])
|
|
|
|
durl = f"http://127.0.0.1:{dsrv}"
|
|
r = t.http(durl + "/old/a")
|
|
t.eq(301, r.status, "a rule holding a doubled dollar loads")
|
|
t.eq("http://example.org/x$y//a", r.header("Location"),
|
|
"and two dollars reach the location as one")
|
|
t.eq(302, t.http(durl + "/re/abc").status,
|
|
"a quoted regular expression keeps its anchor")
|
|
t.eq(200, t.http(durl + "/re/ab9").status,
|
|
"and the anchor is real: what it excludes falls through")
|