Authorization reports 10 when a limit of the service was exceeded,
which every other child answers with 503; the http server took it as
success and answered the request anyway. It now says 503 for itself,
after the body of the request is drained as any answer here does.
A path ending in a backslashed dot-dot, or carrying one in a form the
checks did not name, was taken as it stood. Any dot-dot segment is now
refused wherever it is and whichever separator carries it, and a path
ending in a bare dot of either kind.
- readconfig() kept its line buffer and argument array on every error
return, so each refused reload leaked them.
- A filter refusing a connection in filter_client (TLS: a failed
handshake) was not kept, so its filter_clear never ran and the state
it made was lost. makefilters() now clears it, and empties the slot
first: a pooled worker's slot may hold the previous connection's.
- ssl_filter_close() freed the client CA paths but not the server ones,
for every TLS service set up.
- Compiled patterns were never freed: an ACL's (pcre: and regex: host
names), an httpsrv rule's. copyacl() shared them between the
configuration's ACL and each service's copy; each copy now compiles
its own, and freeacl() and freehttprules() free them.
What LeakSanitizer still reports is OpenSSL's per-thread random
generator state of pooled threads, released only by OpenSSL at exit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Open Watcom has no struct _stat64 or _wstat64: its 64-bit stat is
struct _stati64 and _wstati64, so httpsrv.c did not compile there and
the 1.0.1 lite build had no binaries.
widepath() compared and wrote '\\\\', a two-character constant, for a
backslash: a UNC path (\\server\share) never took the \\?\UNC\ form,
and forward slashes became backslashes only because the constant was
truncated to its last byte.
The Watcom workflow passed although nmake failed; it now fails when
the build does or leaves no 3proxy.exe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9651848bf1)
op_rewrite checked what it built with targetunsafe(), which describes a
path on this machine: on Windows it must name a drive or a share, so a
rewritten request path was refused and every rewrite rule failed there.
A rewrite produces a request path and is checked as one.
The header loop stopped at HTTPSRV_MAXHDR and answered anyway, leaving
the rest of the request in the stream for the next one to be read out
of. It refuses the request instead. A header longer than the buffer
arrives as several lines, so the count bounds what is read rather than
what a client may send in one header.
The test for the buffer growth after a PCRE rewrite sent its request
through to an httpsrv origin, which stops reading at that same cap; it
uses an origin which reads whatever it is sent, since what is under test
is the proxy in the middle.
httpsrv parsed Content-Length and never read what followed. The reply is
followed by a close, and closing a socket that still holds unread data
resets the connection instead of ending it, so a POST could cost the client
the reply it was about to read. Windows does that reliably; the same test
passes on Linux and macOS, which is why it looked flaky. Drain the body,
bounded at a megabyte.
The test CA was built with -addext, which LibreSSL - the openssl on a stock
macOS - does not apply the same way, leaving a certificate that is not
usable as a CA and a client that cannot build a chain to it. Put the
extensions in a file both accept, and verify the generated chain before any
of it is handed to a proxy, so a failure there is not read as a fault in
the proxy.