rpmbuild ran directly on the Ubuntu runner, so the packages carried Ubuntu's
ABI: glibc 2.38, libssl.so.3 and libpcre2-8. No RPM distribution can satisfy
that - RHEL 9 has glibc 2.34, RHEL 8 has 2.28 and OpenSSL 1.1 - so the rpms
were installable nowhere.
Build them in AlmaLinux 8, 9 and 10 containers instead, covering supported
AlmaLinux and CentOS Stream releases. Release: 1%{?dist} already in the spec
now expands, so the packages are named el8, el9 and el10 and can coexist.
Two spec changes are needed for a build outside Ubuntu:
debug_package is disabled. Enterprise Linux enables debuginfo extraction by
default while Ubuntu's rpm does not; the build produces no debug sources, so
rpmbuild aborted on an empty debugsourcefiles.list.
/bin/3proxy is excluded from automatic requires. The installed configuration
file is executable and begins with #!/bin/3proxy, so rpm generates a
dependency on it. rpm 4.16 and later canonicalise that to /usr/bin/3proxy
while %files declares /bin/3proxy, leaving a dependency that can never be
satisfied and making the package uninstallable on el9 and el10.
Enterprise Linux has no 32-bit ARM, so the armhf workflow now builds only the
deb package.
The release key is ed25519, so rpm stores the header signature in
DSAHEADER (EdDSA/SHA256) and RSAHEADER is empty. The verification only
looked at RSAHEADER and failed correctly signed packages.
Do not rely on the gpg-agent passphrase cache surviving between steps:
the signing command gets the passphrase from a file. A test signature is
made first, so a wrong passphrase or a key which can not sign fails with
a clear gpg error instead of an rpm which is silently left unsigned.
On failure the rpm version, the sign command and the key capabilities are
printed.
rpm on Debian/Ubuntu defaults %__gpg to /usr/bin/gpg2, which does not exist,
so rpm --addsign failed with 'Could not exec gpg' and packages were left
unsigned.
GPG signing of rpm packages and detached signatures for deb packages and
for the SHA256SUMS files, using GPG_PRIVATE_KEY / GPG_PASSPHRASE secrets.
Checksums are published as release assets.
Build provenance is attested before the assets are uploaded, so a failed
attestation does not leave unattested files published.
Workflow permissions are read-only, write permissions are requested per
job only where they are used.
Docker: single workflow, one job per image per platform instead of one
workflow per registry. Platforms are built in parallel and pushed by
digest, then combined into a manifest list pushed to Docker Hub and GHCR
at once, so both registries get identical digests. arm64 and arm/v7 build
on native arm runners, ppc64le is dropped.
Registry provenance/sbom attestations are disabled (they were shown as
unknown/unknown entries in the registries), build provenance is attested
with actions/attest-build-provenance instead and is verifiable with
'gh attestation verify oci://...'. Release binaries (rpm, deb, zip) are
attested the same way. cosign version is pinned and images are signed by
digest.
