Three arrangements, with key material generated for the run rather than
kept in the tree: a proxy wrapped in TLS, a proxy that reaches a TLS parent
and verifies it against the CA, and MITM.
The MITM case checks what interception is for: the decrypted request line,
URI and all, reaches the log, where the same request through a plain
CONNECT tunnel leaves only the host and port.
The origin runs in its own process there so the proxy log holds only what
the proxy saw, and log assertions wait, since a record is written when the
connection finishes rather than when the reply arrives.
Verification of the spoofed certificate is deliberately not strict: 3proxy
issues those without an Authority Key Identifier, which Python rejects
under its 3.13 defaults.
The cmake Windows build links vcpkg's pcre2, whose DLL lives in
c:/vcpkg/installed/x64-windows/bin. Running the tests without that on PATH
started a 3proxy that died at load with 0xC0000135 before opening a socket,
which the suite could only report as "never listened".
Report the reason instead of leaving it blank: name the exit code, and say
when a body is empty because the request failed rather than because the
reply carried nothing.
