The Win32 "lite" build with Open Watcom (Makefile.watcom, its release
workflow, the CMake branch for it) was the only one built without IPv6
(NOIPV6), without fibers and event loops, with a select() of its own
for poll() (mypoll()), and with the calling conventions of Watcom's
pragmas in the plugins. They are gone with it: every build has IPv6,
and polls with poll() on Unix and WSAPoll() on Windows, which were
what every other build asked for (WITH_POLL, WITH_WSAPOLL, the
3PROXY_USE_POLL and 3PROXY_USE_WSAPOLL options of CMake, FD_SETSIZE
for select()). getip(), the IPv4-only resolver of NOIPV6, goes too.
Plugin binary compatibility: plugins built with Open Watcom, and their
calling convention, are no longer supported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A wait may end with nothing to read: a TLS record not yet whole, a
connection gone before it is accepted, and, once clients share a
thread, nothing more than a chance to try. Where a read or an accept()
followed a wait on a blocking socket, or ended the operation when it
found nothing, the socket is non-blocking and the wait is made again:
the listening sockets of SOCKS BIND and of FTP passive mode, httpsrv
reading what is left of a request body, and the RADIUS client, which
reads with sockrecvfrom().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bandwidth limiter between HTTP requests and httpsrv's delay slept
with usleep(); they are waits of sockpoll() with no fds, to be made
other than by sleeping once a client is served by an event loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A layer over the sockets, TLS or a plugin's, no longer waits itself.
Its _prepoll only tells what it knows without asking the system: the
fds it knows to be ready, data TLS has already decrypted, or, returning
0, that the sockets have to be polled, for events it may rewrite: a
TLS read waiting for its socket to be writable. The wait is
sockpoll()'s, which calls _prepoll first and then polls, so that a wait
can be made other than with poll() in one place: a client of an event
loop is to wait in the loop. Whatever a rewritten wait gets is given to
the caller as what it asked for, its chance to try again, and the
events it asked for are given back. With no fds sockpoll() sleeps,
which WSAPoll() would refuse.
TLS remembers what a read or a write it could not do waits for. A read
needing to write, or a write to read, was an error which ended the
connection, as when TLS 1.3 answers a key update while the socket
cannot take more; it now waits for what TLS needs, as one needing what
it was asked for always did.
Incompatible for plugins, which have to be built again with the same
version of 3proxy, the structures they share not kept compatible:
- struct sockfuncs has _prepoll(state, fds, nfds) in place of
_poll(state, fds, nfds, timeout). A plugin replacing _poll replaces
_prepoll: it must not wait, returns the number of fds it set revents
of (events then left as they are), 0 for the fds to be polled (with
events as it leaves them, revents left to the poll) or -1, and calls
the _prepoll it replaced when it has nothing to say itself.
- Waiting for sockets is sockpoll(sf, state, fds, nfds, timeout), not
so._poll() of the socket functions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- readconfig() kept its line buffer and argument array on every error
return, so each refused reload leaked them.
- A filter refusing a connection in filter_client (TLS: a failed
handshake) was not kept, so its filter_clear never ran and the state
it made was lost. makefilters() now clears it, and empties the slot
first: a pooled worker's slot may hold the previous connection's.
- ssl_filter_close() freed the client CA paths but not the server ones,
for every TLS service set up.
- Compiled patterns were never freed: an ACL's (pcre: and regex: host
names), an httpsrv rule's. copyacl() shared them between the
configuration's ACL and each service's copy; each copy now compiles
its own, and freeacl() and freehttprules() free them.
What LeakSanitizer still reports is OpenSSL's per-thread random
generator state of pooled threads, released only by OpenSSL at exit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Open Watcom has no struct _stat64 or _wstat64: its 64-bit stat is
struct _stati64 and _wstati64, so httpsrv.c did not compile there and
the 1.0.1 lite build had no binaries.
widepath() compared and wrote '\\\\', a two-character constant, for a
backslash: a UNC path (\\server\share) never took the \\?\UNC\ form,
and forward slashes became backslashes only because the constant was
truncated to its last byte.
The Watcom workflow passed although nmake failed; it now fails when
the build does or leaves no 3proxy.exe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9651848bf1)
op_rewrite checked what it built with targetunsafe(), which describes a
path on this machine: on Windows it must name a drive or a share, so a
rewritten request path was refused and every rewrite rule failed there.
A rewrite produces a request path and is checked as one.
The header loop stopped at HTTPSRV_MAXHDR and answered anyway, leaving
the rest of the request in the stream for the next one to be read out
of. It refuses the request instead. A header longer than the buffer
arrives as several lines, so the count bounds what is read rather than
what a client may send in one header.
The test for the buffer growth after a PCRE rewrite sent its request
through to an httpsrv origin, which stops reading at that same cap; it
uses an origin which reads whatever it is sent, since what is under test
is the proxy in the middle.
httpsrv parsed Content-Length and never read what followed. The reply is
followed by a close, and closing a socket that still holds unread data
resets the connection instead of ending it, so a POST could cost the client
the reply it was about to read. Windows does that reliably; the same test
passes on Linux and macOS, which is why it looked flaky. Drain the body,
bounded at a megabyte.
The test CA was built with -addext, which LibreSSL - the openssl on a stock
macOS - does not apply the same way, leaving a certificate that is not
usable as a CA and a client that cannot build a chain to it. Put the
extensions in a file both accept, and verify the generated chain before any
of it is handed to a proxy, so a failure there is not read as a fault in
the proxy.