Fix rewrite and over-long header handling on Windows
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op_rewrite checked what it built with targetunsafe(), which describes a
path on this machine: on Windows it must name a drive or a share, so a
rewritten request path was refused and every rewrite rule failed there.
A rewrite produces a request path and is checked as one.

The header loop stopped at HTTPSRV_MAXHDR and answered anyway, leaving
the rest of the request in the stream for the next one to be read out
of. It refuses the request instead. A header longer than the buffer
arrives as several lines, so the count bounds what is read rather than
what a client may send in one header.

The test for the buffer growth after a PCRE rewrite sent its request
through to an httpsrv origin, which stops reading at that same cap; it
uses an origin which reads whatever it is sent, since what is under test
is the proxy in the middle.
This commit is contained in:
Vladimir Dubrovin committed 2026-08-29 20:37:12 +03:00
1 parent 5400d53cef
commit f265ea0b52
3 files changed
+43 -14

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+14 -2
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@@ -937,7 +937,11 @@ static int op_rewrite(struct httpreq *r, const unsigned char *params)
if(!params || !*params) return op_forbidden(r);
if(expand(path, sizeof(path), params, r->path, r->caps, r->ncaps))
return op_forbidden(r);
if(targetunsafe(path) || path[0] != '/') return op_forbidden(r);
/* What comes out is a request path and is checked as one. A path on this
machine is a different thing, and asking a rewrite to look like one
would leave nothing writable on Windows, where such a path names a
drive or a share. */
if(path[0] != '/' || pathunsafe(path)) return op_forbidden(r);
strcpy(r->path, path);
return HTTPSRV_REWRITTEN;
}
@@ -1327,9 +1331,12 @@ static int httpsrv_request(struct clientparam *param, struct httpreq *r)
strcpy(r->path, decoded);
}
while(hdrs++ < HTTPSRV_MAXHDR &&
/* A header longer than the buffer arrives as several lines, so the count
bounds what is read and not what a client may send in one header. */
while(hdrs < HTTPSRV_MAXHDR &&
(i = sockgetlinebuf(param, CLIENT, (unsigned char *)buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
'\n', conf.timeouts[STRING_S])) > 2){
hdrs++;
if(rawkeep(r, buf, i)) RETURN(710);
buf[i] = 0;
if(!strncasecmp(buf, "host:", 5) && !r->proxy){
@@ -1384,6 +1391,11 @@ static int httpsrv_request(struct clientparam *param, struct httpreq *r)
}
}
/* The headers ran past what this server reads, so the rest of the request
is still in the stream and there is no answering it: what follows would
be read as the request after this one. */
if(hdrs >= HTTPSRV_MAXHDR) RETURN(712);
/* The next request begins where this body ends, so a body which cannot
be read to its end - one this server does not frame, or one longer
than it is willing to read - closes the connection instead.