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Fix MitM for MacOS clients (openssl only)
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@@ -19,6 +19,45 @@ authentication is currently available.
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<li>Always limit connections to the internal network and localhost (to 127.0.0.1 and
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all interfaces) with ACLs. Be careful, because the BIND command in SOCKS requires the
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BIND method with the external interface IP address to be allowed.
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<li>Services resolve IPv4 only unless told otherwise ('-4' is the default). Enabling
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IPv6 with '-6', '-46' or '-64' makes every ACL written in IPv4 incomplete, because the
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same host can be asked for in another way. A proxy that denies 127.0.0.1 but has IPv6
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enabled still reaches that host as '::ffff:127.0.0.1', and reaches the machine again as
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'::1', which is a different address the IPv4 rule never mentioned. When IPv6 is enabled,
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deny the mapped form '::ffff:0:0/96' as well unless it is needed, and deny the IPv6
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addresses that correspond to whatever the IPv4 rules protect: '::1' and '::' for the
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local machine, 'fe80::/10' for link-local and 'fc00::/7' for unique local addresses.
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Denying the IPv4 spelling alone is not enough.
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<li>With '-46' or '-64' a name resolves to either family, so a target ACL that names
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only one of a host's addresses does not limit that host. Names are resolved into
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separate caches, and a name that resolves to an IPv6 address is only cached when
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'nscache6' is configured.
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<li>The 'admin' service hands out counters, the list of running services and a way to
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trigger a configuration reload. Bind it to an internal interface, and put
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authentication and an ACL in front of it. The '-s' option limits what the pages offer
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but is not authentication.
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<li>The 'echo' and 'data' operations of the 'http' command exist for testing. 'data'
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returns a response of whatever size the request asks for, so a listener offering it to
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anyone is a traffic amplifier. Do not configure them on a public service.
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<li>'ssl_server_ca_key' is the private key of a certificate authority that clients have
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been told to trust. Anyone who obtains it can impersonate any site to those clients, so
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protect it as a signing key and use a CA created for this purpose only, never one that
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is trusted for anything else. Restrict the 'ssl_certcache' directory as well: it holds
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the certificates generated from that key.
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<li>Interception ('ssl_mitm') ends the guarantee the client believes it has. The full
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URL of every request inside the tunnel, query string included, becomes visible to the
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proxy and reaches the log, where a plain CONNECT would have shown only a host and a
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port. Treat those logs accordingly.
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<li>Certificates generated for interception by a build against wolfSSL carry no key
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identifiers, because that library cannot generate certificate extensions, and a client
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verifying strictly (OpenSSL 'x509_strict', which recent Python enables by default)
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rejects them. Builds against OpenSSL generate them. Where they are missing, turning
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verification off in the client removes the protection interception was supposed to
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preserve; use an OpenSSL build instead.
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<li>Regular expression rules ('pcre', 'pcre_rewrite') are matched without
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authentication and do not replace ACLs. A rewrite that would change the method or the
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destination of a request is ignored, because the destination was already authorized;
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do not rely on one to redirect traffic.
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<li>Before 3proxy 0.8, always use nserver and nscache under Unix; otherwise, a DoS attack is possible
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with an unreachable DNS server (because gethostbyname will block other threads).
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<li>Keep logs in a secure location, because some confidential information from
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