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Add tests
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"""Request parsing: decoding, path safety, malformed and oversized input.
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These go over a raw socket, because a well-behaved client would normalise
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most of them away before they ever reached the server.
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"""
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def run(t):
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srv = t.free_port()
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t.start("httpsrv_parsing", f"""
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log
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auth iponly
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allow *
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http * /echo* echo
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http * /safe/* echo
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httpsrv -p{srv}
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""", ports=[srv])
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def request(path, host="t", extra=""):
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return t.raw(srv, f"GET {path} HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: {host}\r\n{extra}\r\n")
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# --- percent-decoding ---------------------------------------------
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reply = request("/%65cho")
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t.contains(reply, "200 OK", "a percent-encoded path is decoded before matching")
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t.contains(reply, "path=/echo", "the decoded path is what gets reported")
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t.contains(request("/echo%20space"), "glob= space",
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"an encoded space decodes into the glob")
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# --- traversal -----------------------------------------------------
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for path in ("/safe/../etc/passwd", "/safe/%2e%2e/etc", "/safe/..%2fetc",
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"/echo/../../x"):
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t.not_contains(request(path), "200 OK", f"traversal is refused: {path}")
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t.contains(request("/safe/./ok"), "200 OK",
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"a harmless dot segment is still served")
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# --- injection ------------------------------------------------------
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t.not_contains(request("/echo%0d%0aInjected:%20yes"), "Injected: yes",
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"an encoded CRLF cannot inject a header")
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t.not_contains(request("/echo%00cut"), "200 OK", "an encoded NUL is refused")
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# a header value cannot smuggle a newline into the echoed output
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reply = request("/echo", host="evil", extra="X-Injected: yes\r\n")
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t.not_contains(reply, "host=evil\nX-Injected",
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"header values stay in their own fields")
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# --- malformed ------------------------------------------------------
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t.not_contains(t.raw(srv, "GARBAGE\r\n\r\n"), "200 OK",
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"a malformed request line is not served")
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t.not_contains(t.raw(srv, "GET\r\n\r\n"), "200 OK",
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"a request line with no URL is not served")
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# an over-long path has to be refused rather than quietly truncated to
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# something shorter that might match another rule
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t.not_contains(request("/echo" + "a" * 9000), "200 OK",
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"an over-long path is refused, not truncated")
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# --- methods --------------------------------------------------------
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url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{srv}"
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t.eq(200, t.http(url + "/echo", method="HEAD").status, "HEAD is accepted")
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r = t.http(url + "/echo", method="POST", body="payload=1",
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headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"})
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t.contains(r, "method=POST", "POST reaches the handler")
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t.contains(r, "content.length=9", "the POST content length is parsed")
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