socks: a host name with control bytes or spaces is refused where it is read

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Vladimir Dubrovin committed 2026-11-18 20:43:58 +03:00
1 parent 734c968030
commit 46297ecf7e
5 files changed
+102

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@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
"""The SOCKS proxy, reaching the built-in server."""
import socket
import struct
def recvall(sock, count):
"""Bytes from a socket, fewer only when the peer stops sending."""
data = b""
while len(data) < count:
chunk = sock.recv(count - len(data))
if not chunk:
break
data += chunk
return data
def run(t):
if not t.skip_unless("httpsrv"):
@@ -96,3 +110,72 @@ def run(t):
"wrong SOCKS5 credentials are refused")
t.ne(None, t.socks_connect(guarded, "127.0.0.1", srv),
"SOCKS5 without credentials is refused")
# --- names a client may not choose -------------------------------------
# A destination name travels into the request lines of parent protocols,
# so a control byte or a space in it could end the line early and name
# another destination. Such a name is refused where it is read, before
# anything is resolved or connected: reply 1, not the reply of a
# destination which does not answer.
sname = t.free_port()
standin = t.free_port()
t.start("socks_names", f"""
log
fakeresolve
auth iponly
allow *
socks -p{sname}
""", ports=[sname])
def socks5_name(name, port):
"""The reply code of a SOCKS5 CONNECT naming the given name."""
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", sname), t.timeout) as s:
s.settimeout(t.timeout)
s.sendall(b"\x05\x01\x00")
if recvall(s, 2) != b"\x05\x00":
return None
s.sendall(b"\x05\x01\x00\x03" + bytes([len(name)]) + name +
struct.pack("!H", port))
reply = recvall(s, 4)
return reply[1] if len(reply) > 1 else None
def socks4_name(name, port):
"""The reply code of a SOCKS4a CONNECT naming the given name."""
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", sname), t.timeout) as s:
s.settimeout(t.timeout)
s.sendall(struct.pack(">BBH", 4, 1, port) +
socket.inet_aton("0.0.0.0") + b"case\x00" + name +
b"\x00")
reply = recvall(s, 8)
return reply[1] if len(reply) > 1 else None
t.eq(1, socks5_name(b"127.0.0.1\r\nGET /other HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\nstand-in.example",
standin),
"a name with CR LF in it is refused")
t.eq(91, socks4_name(b"127.0.0.1\r\nGET /other HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\nstand-in.example",
standin),
"SOCKS4a refuses a name with CR LF in it")
t.eq(1, socks5_name(b"127.0.0.1 stand-in.example", standin),
"a name with a space in it is refused")
t.eq(1, socks5_name(b"stand-in\x7f.example", standin),
"a name with a control byte in it is refused")
# a well-formed name is let through, to the 127.0.0.2 fakeresolve maps
# every name to; where that address can be served, the tunnel has to be
# carried all the way to it
probe = socket.socket()
try:
probe.bind(("127.0.0.2", 0))
except OSError:
probe.close()
t.skip("the stand-in address 127.0.0.2 can not be bound here")
else:
probe.close()
stop = t.raw_server(standin, b"from the stand-in\r\n",
host="127.0.0.2")
t.eq(0, socks5_name(b"stand-in.example", standin),
"a well-formed name is connected by name")
t.eq(90, socks4_name(b"stand-in.example", standin),
"a well-formed name is connected by name over SOCKS4a")
stop()