Publish and sign a source tarball with each release

Package maintainers, Gentoo among them, build from source and had nothing
signed to verify against: the source archive GitHub generates for a tag is
neither signed nor guaranteed to stay byte-identical.

Add release-tarball.yml. It builds 3proxy-<version>.tar.gz with git archive
from the release tag, signs the tarball and SHA256SUMS-src with the release
key, attests build provenance and uploads all four files to the release.

Also drop the SECURITY.md line about Authenticode signing, left over from the
removal of self-signed Windows binaries.

Closes #1270

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Vladimir Dubrovin 2026-09-16 14:44:14 +03:00
parent b61ae3feac
commit 3bd7cee5b7
2 changed files with 99 additions and 4 deletions

85
.github/workflows/release-tarball.yml vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
name: Release source tarball
on:
release:
types: [published]
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
tarball:
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write
attestations: write
name: "source tarball"
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: env
run: |
if [ -f RELEASE ]; then
RELEASE=$(tr -d ' \t\r\n' < RELEASE)
else
RELEASE=$(tr -d ' \t\r\n' < DEVEL)
fi
echo "RELEASE=$RELEASE" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- name: Create tarball
run: |
# git archive is reproducible from the tag: anyone can regenerate the
# tarball and compare it against the published checksum.
git archive --format=tar.gz -9 \
--prefix="3proxy-${{ env.RELEASE }}/" \
-o "3proxy-${{ env.RELEASE }}.tar.gz" HEAD
tar tzf "3proxy-${{ env.RELEASE }}.tar.gz" >/dev/null
ls -l *.tar.gz
- name: Get artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with:
name: "3proxy-${{ env.RELEASE }}-src"
path: "*.tar.gz"
- name: Import signing key
if: github.event_name == 'release'
env:
GPG_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}
run: |
if [ -z "$GPG_PRIVATE_KEY" ]; then echo "GPG_PRIVATE_KEY is not set"; exit 1; fi
mkdir -p ~/.gnupg && chmod 700 ~/.gnupg
printf 'allow-loopback-pinentry\n' > ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
gpgconf --kill gpg-agent || true
printf '%s' "$GPG_PRIVATE_KEY" | gpg --batch --import
KEYID=$(gpg --list-secret-keys --with-colons | awk -F: '/^sec:/{print $5; exit}')
echo "GPG_KEYID=$KEYID" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- name: Checksums and detached signatures
if: github.event_name == 'release'
env:
GPG_PASSPHRASE: ${{ secrets.GPG_PASSPHRASE }}
run: |
sha256sum *.tar.gz > SHA256SUMS-src
for f in *.tar.gz SHA256SUMS-src; do
gpg --batch --yes --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase "$GPG_PASSPHRASE" \
-u "$GPG_KEYID" --armor --detach-sign "$f"
done
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-src
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-src.asc SHA256SUMS-src
- name: Attest build provenance
if: github.event_name == 'release'
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
with:
subject-path: |
*.tar.gz
- name: Upload to release
if: github.event_name == 'release'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
TAG: ${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}
run: gh release upload "$TAG" *.tar.gz *.tar.gz.asc SHA256SUMS-src SHA256SUMS-src.asc

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@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ For High/Critical patched version is released within 2 weeks
## Verifying downloads ## Verifying downloads
Release binaries are published with SHA256 checksums, an OpenPGP signature and Release binaries and the source tarball are published with SHA256 checksums, an
a GitHub build provenance attestation. OpenPGP signature and a GitHub build provenance attestation.
The release signing key is `3proxy-release-key.asc` in the root of this The release signing key is `3proxy-release-key.asc` in the root of this
repository, an RSA-4096 key: repository, an RSA-4096 key:
@ -40,6 +40,18 @@ gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-x86_64.asc SHA256SUMS-x86_64
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-x86_64 sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-x86_64
``` ```
The source tarball published with each release is signed as well:
```
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-src.asc SHA256SUMS-src
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-src
gpg --verify 3proxy-0.9.9.tar.gz.asc 3proxy-0.9.9.tar.gz
```
Prefer it over the `Source code (tar.gz)` link GitHub generates automatically:
only the published tarball is signed. It is produced with `git archive` from
the release tag, so it can be regenerated and compared byte for byte.
RPM packages are signed, the signature is checked by rpm itself: RPM packages are signed, the signature is checked by rpm itself:
``` ```
@ -60,5 +72,3 @@ verified with the GitHub CLI:
gh attestation verify 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.rpm --owner 3proxy gh attestation verify 3proxy-0.9.9.x86_64.rpm --owner 3proxy
gh attestation verify oci://docker.io/3proxy/3proxy:lts --owner 3proxy gh attestation verify oci://docker.io/3proxy/3proxy:lts --owner 3proxy
``` ```
Windows binaries are Authenticode signed in addition to the above.